SINO-INDIA WARFARE

Under Marshall Liu Bocheng, the People’s Liberation Army of China launched an assault on the Eastern and Western theatres of the Indo-China border in “self defence counter attack”. What ensued was a humiliating defeat to the Indian’s which exposed its un-preparedness and exposed its weak military capabilities. Consequentially, India saw sweeping changes in its military apparatus and steadily equipped itself to handle such situations in the future.

The Asian giant, in its quest for regional dominance, undertook a programme of large scale militarization whereas India spared no efforts in trying to match China’s military might. China successfully test fired its first nuclear weapon at Lap Nor on October 18, 1964 which led to panic in Camp India. A decade later, May 18, 1974 saw India’s first nuclear detonation at Pokhran, Project Smiling Buddha, a response of sorts to Chinese advancements in nuclear weaponry. This bold move by the Indians, a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, was strident .This move gave birth to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a global cartel of countries exporting nuclear substances, initiated by the Americans with the objective of controlling nuclear proliferation.

According to reports released by US Department of Defence in 2006, military expenditure by the Chinese government exceeded $80 billion, though the Chinese denied such heavy spending. In an official statement, the Chinese have claimed an expenditure of only $30 billion, which according to experts is a gross understatement. Actual military might and expenditure is veiled to create a strategic advantage of uncertainty over adversaries. India spends $22 billion annually to upgrade military capabilities and does not conceal budget allocations. In its democratic system of functioning, the Government is accountable to its taxpayers.
Four decades and more after the 1962 war, tension still looms across the North-Eastern borders of India and China .Dr . Rajan , Director of Chennai Centre on China Studies, says that the defence community of the People’s Republic of China don’t rule out a border conflict. From a strategic perspective, sources view India’s border military re-enforcements and counter measures as a process of equipping itself for military engagement.

In the event of war, both countries would engage in ‘partial’ or ‘total war’. Partial war involves a country using only some of its resources – be it military, human, economic, technological or natural resources – to engage in battle instead of all its resources. Partial war is the antonym of ‘total war’ which means unlimited mobilization of available resources to counter resistance with the intention of overpowering its enemy/enemies.

Experts believe that the Chinese are far superior in military capabilities when compared with India. The Indians don’t see the need to militarize as much as the Chinese since they don’t have a military adversary to be wary of other than Pakistan. The Chinese would have two reasons for flexing their military might: to establish Chinese dominance in Asia, including conflicts over Taiwan with the USA;and to make the Americans aware that it is a force to reckon with.
Trade seems to dictate terms in the Sino-India context just now. War is not the most feasible option for both countries as they make all efforts in capturing markets to enhance their economic strength. Bilateral talks and tireless efforts by both Governments have put thoughts of war on the backburner. Only time will tell whether the relationship falls apart and spirals out of control.

INDO U.S CIVIL NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

The Indo-U.S civilian nuclear deal is a bilateral agreement between the United States of America and India on civil nuclear cooperation. The intent of pursing nuclear trade between the two countries for civil purposes was announced in a joint statement made in 2005 by the two heads of government, Prime Minister of India Dr.Manmohan Singh and President of the United States, George W. Bush. The initial framework required India to separate its civil and military nuclear establishments and maintain all civil facilities subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, including periodic inspection.

The agreement had to pass through several intricate procedures and complex stages to before either Government could ratify terms. There was stiff opposition from various quarters that even put to test the stability of Manmohan Singh’s government. The coalition government in India at the time, namely the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), a coming together of the Congress and the Left led by Communist Party of India (M), had serious differences over the civilian nuclear deal: both parties foresaw entirely dissimilar consequences for India’s national interests. Dr Manmohan Singh tirelessly stressed on the agreement’s development facet, which meant an addition of 25,000 MW of nuclear power capacity by 2020. Nuclear power means less oil imports, thereby reducing the foreign exchange burden and mitigating pollution effects on the environment. This also meant that the nuclear energy market saw a business potential of $140 billion, to be lapped up by private and public companies alike over the next 10-15 years.

Obstacles were not limited only to internal differences. Project ‘Smiling Buddha’, India’s nuclear test at Pokhran in early 1974, saw an informal organization being constituted and led by the United States called the Nuclear Suppliers Group ( NSG), an export cartel that took the initiative in support of nuclear non-proliferation by controlling supplies of radio-active substances which could otherwise lead to the burgeoning of nuclear arsenals around the world. The Nuclear Suppliers Group with its 45 member countries did not unanimously agree on export of enriched nuclear substance to India, a nuclear weapon state which was not a signatory to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty(NPT). There was objection from member countries such as Switzerland, Ireland, Pakistan and Scandinavian countries which sought to include conditions in the waiver granted by the NSG. China too expressed worries over the waiver but quickly retracted its stance stating it had no objection to the agreement being finalized.



Former President and Missile Scientist A.P.J Abdul Kalam

The international community, comprising non-proliferation activists the world over, saw this coming together as tantamount to undermining the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Right from the deal’s inception, they had sought a tightening of the terms and conditions which would otherwise set a precedent for non believers in the NPT to take advantage of this soft stance. Israel’s ambitions of building its own nuclear power plant seem more likely after the Indo-U.S civil nuclear agreement. India’s un-friendly neighbour on the East, Pakistan has been seeking such cooperation from the North American giant but the latter is not as forthcoming.

The U.S Congress was prompt in making necessary amendments to the Hyde Act and certifying the new law. U.S experts say that with India promoting nuclear energy, it would help diminish demand for oil from the Middle East, which would help stabilize prices. Some believe this move by the Bush government was intended to carve a new path for in Indo-U.S relations, making India a worthy partner in the Asian region. India’s ‘deterrence policy’ and status as an emerging global economic power are probably reasons for the number of deviations allowed for this agreement to materialize. Is the agreement truly beneficial to India? The deal states that the United States has the right to terminate export of enriched substances if India test fires a nuclear weapon. Has India inadvertently accepted the NPT without actually signing it? Prime Minister Manmohan Singh threatened to resign if the deal was not ratified by Indian Parliament. His aggressive stance overshadowed his docile nature as he sought what was best for India’s tomorrow. October 10, 2008 went down as a red letter day in the books of history, for the Indo-U.S Civil Nuclear Co-operation Agreement was signed on that day by then Minister for External Affairs, Pranab Mukherjee and US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice in Washington, opening a new chapter in nuclear relations.

SINO-INDIA RELATIONS

Recent years have witnessed a steady growth of economic ties between India and Japan, with the latter emerging as the third largest contributor to Foreign Direct Investment in India. Chinese diplomats don’t seem too happy about this newfound affinity, causing nervous flutters in Beijing. Recent statements by IAF Chief P.V Naik on the proposed upgradation of airfields in the North-East and eventual posting of a whole squadron in that region have the Chinese frowning even more gravely.
The annual growth of international trade between the two Asian neighbours, India and China, is around 15 %; it has increased by 50 % in the last five years. Bilateral trade ties have grown exponentially since 2005 as agreed by both Prime Ministers, with annual trade expected to reach $60 billion by 2010. It is projected that by 2050, India and China will be the two leading economies in the world, which further reiterates the need for strong bilateral trade ties and better economic co-operation.

The economies of both countries are bound to be, crippled in the event of a protracted war. Is it worth risking such a development through mutual provocation? The past has been witness to a fair share of provocative actions by either side. Prime Minister Nehru’s “Forward” policy of building outposts in gross violation of the internationally accepted McMahon Line was perceived as a threat to China. In 1959, when Prime Minister Nehru welcomed the fleeing Dalai Lama to India, Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, was infuriated, prompting d him to make this statement: “Be sharp, don't fear to irritate him [Nehru], don't fear to cause him trouble. Nehru miscalculated the situation believing that China could not suppress the rebellion in Tibet and would have to beg India's help.”

The year 1962 saw the Chinese waging war on India, which led to the latter, hopelessly unprepared, being defeated. The outcome of the Sino-India border conflict in 1962 prompted British journalist Neville Maxwell to write that "the hopelessly ill-prepared Indian Army that provoked China on orders emanating from Delhi, paid the price for its misadventure in men, money and national humiliation".
The late 80’s saw China’s irresponsible action of arming Pakistan with nuclear weapons capability as they had cheekily empowered the otherwise weak Pakistani defence which led to panic in camp India. One is reminded of former Secretary of State of the United States Henry Kissinger’s famous words, “India lives in a tough neighbourhood”.

Today, the still unresolved Tibet issue seems to stick out like a sore thumb in Sino-India relations. Recently the Dalai Lama wanted to visit Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, which is not legally recognised as Indian Territory by the Chinese. Experts say it is a dead issue that is causing more harm than good for India .The Indian government took a firm stand, saying that the Dalai Lama was free to exercise his sovereign right of travelling to any part of India. Minister for Foreign Affairs S.M Krishna declared that the Dalai Lama need not hesitate in travelling to anywhere he chose to.

The Chinese are reportedly building a dam over the Brahmaputra at its source in Tibet which is a deep cause of concern for India. The Brahmaputra is considered the lifeline of the Assam Valley and tampering with its flow could have drastic effects. Many organizations have voiced their dissent as this could lead to severe flooding and also dry up the river during winters.Dr Mohan Malik, a Sinologist with a PhD in International Relations from the Australian National Uinversity, believes that China is trying extremely hard to overpower India’s growth since the former’s monopoly over the South Asian corridor seems to be under threat. Its relentless efforts towards killing India’s civilian nuclear deal with the United States and its exercise of veto rights against India’s entry into the UN Security Council have not endeared China to those in New Delhi.

Dr Malik believes that if India has to emerge as a global player, then it had better sort out the issues it faces in its own backyard before things spiral out of control. The Dalai Lama and the Tibet issue are to be handled by India maintaining the same firm stance that it always has been over the last few decades. Proposals for swapping territories on the northern border are not a solution to the long-standing conflict between the two countries.

In military terms, India is no pushover . Unlike the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which last fought a war in 1979, the Indian Army has been constantly engaged in real war and has an experienced military outfit. India is not willing to face a repeat of the 1962 war where a large territory was ceded to the enemy, Beijing will have to battle it out to stake its claim for Arunachal Pradesh.
China and India have an important role to play in building a post-American world order. They hold enormous stakes in the maintenance of peace and responsibility, writes Dr Mohan Malik. For now, bilateral talks seem to be the most feasible means of pursuing this goal. War is the last option, a choice best ignored.